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I. INTRODUCTION
After decades of bitter conflict in the Middle East,1 Israel and
Palestine have embarked on a historic quest for peace. On Monday,
0 Lead Article Editor, Seattle University Law Review. B.A. 1991, Austin College; J.D.
Candidate 1995, Seattle University School of Law.
1. For a discussion of the history of the conflict in the Middle East, see generally PETER
MANSFIELD, A HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST (1991). For an analysis of the modem conflicts
in the Middle East, see generally DAVID KIMICHE, THE LAST OPTION (1991). For an historical
perspective of the history of Israel drawn from the Hebrew Bible, see MICHAEL GRANT, THE
HISTORY OF ANCIENT ISRAEL (1984).
Although the history of the conflict in the Middle East is long and complicated, the following
is a brief summary of highlights from the last century:
*1882 - Jewish immigrants in "Lovers of Zion" movement begin to arrive in
Palestine from Eastern Europe.
01896 - Theodor Herzl publishes Zionist treatise outlining the establishment of a
state of the Jews.
*1917 - British Balfour Declaration declares that it "views with favor" the
establishment of a "Jewish National Home" in Palestine.
01937 - Spurred by heightened Arab-Jewish tension, British Peel Commission
recommends partitioning Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state.
*1939 - British government issues White Paper backing away from partition idea.
*1945 - World War II ends with attention focused on survivors of Nazi holocaust.
*1947 - UN votes to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states.
*1948-49 - State of Israel emerges from fighting in Arab-Israeli war. More than
600,000 Palestinians are expelled or flee their homes during the fighting. Jordan
captures West Bank. Israel signs armistices with Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.
*1956 - Israel captures Sinai Peninsula from Egypt; withdraws following year.
*1967 - Israel launches Six Day War and captures old city of Jerusalem, West
Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and Sinai Peninsula. Annexes East Jerusalem, and in
subsequent years, establishes settlements in occupied territories with stated aim of
boosting security.
*1973 - Egypt and Syria launch October war, triggering stepped-up US diplomacy
in region.
*1977 - Hard-line Likud party leader Menachem Begin elected prime minister in
upset of Labor party. Oversees large-scale settlement drive in West Bank (Judea and
Samaria).
*1979 - [Israeli Prime Minister] Begin signs peace treaty with Egypt.
*1982 - Israeli troops invade Lebanon in bid to crush PLO.
*1987 - Palestinians launch uprising in occupied territories.
01992 - Labor Party ousts Likud on platform of "peace with security."
41993 - Israel and PLO sign Declaration of Principles calling for Palestinian self-
rule in Gaza and Jericho.
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September 13, 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Pales-
tinian leader Yasser Arafat signed a draft Declaration of Principles.2
The Declaration provides guidelines for a five-year interim period of
autonomy for Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza
Strip.3 Further, the Declaration calls for negotiations leading to the
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242,'
which provides for the acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and political independence of every state in the Middle East.'
The signing of the Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization
[hereinafter PLO] Declaration of Principles presents questions regard-
ing the legal status of Palestine. Although the traditional view has been
that Palestine is not a state,6 it is possible that Palestine will meet the
requirements of statehood following the interim period provided for in
the Declaration.7
This Comment argues that the Declaration of Principles falls short
of establishing a state of Palestine during the interim period provided
for in the Declaration. However, this Comment presents the possibil-
ity that a state of Palestine will be established after the interim period.
If a state of Palestine is established, it will have an effect on current
United States law regarding Palestine and the PLO's sovereign immu-
nity and standing to sue.'
Ben Lynfield, Highlights of Zionist History, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Jan. 25, 1994, at 7,
reprinted by permission from the Christian Science Monitor. The Christian Science Publishing
Society, all rights reserved.
2. Peter Ford, Palestinian Self-Rule Pact: What it Will and Won't Do, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Sept. 13, 1993, at 2.
3. Id.
4. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Agreements, September 13, 1993,
Isr.-Palestine, art. I, 32 I.L.M. 1525 [hereinafter Declaration].
5. Security Council Resolution 242 was enacted on November 22, 1967 and called for Israeli
withdrawal from territories occupied in the recent (1967) conflict, for a just settlement of the
refugee problem, and for respect of the territorial integrity and political independence of every
state in the area. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1382d mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/
Rev.2 (1968). For the view that "state" in this Resolution did not include Palestine, see James L.
Prince, The International Legal Implications of the November 1988 Palestinian Declaration of
Statehood, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 681, 688 (1989).
6. See generally Prince, supra note 5.
7. Statehood is advantageous for Palestine because under international law, a state has
(a) sovereignty over its territory and general authority over its nationals;
(b) status as a legal person, with capacity to own, acquire, and transfer property,
to make contracts and enter into international agreements, to become a member of
international organizations, and to pursue, and be subject to, legal remedies;
(c) capacity to join with other states to make international law, as customary law
or by international agreement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].
8. Under United States law, an entity not recognized as a state is ordinarily denied access to
courts of the United States. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 205. See
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The traditional view has been that Palestine is not a state. 9 Inter-
national law provides that for an entity to be a state, it must have (1) a
defined territory, (2) a permanent population, (3) an authority exercis-
ing governmental functions, and (4) a capacity to conduct foreign rela-
tions.1" International law provides two approaches to the impact of
recognition on statehood. The declaratory approach to the impact of
recognition on statehood is that once an entity has fulfilled these four
objective requirements it is a state, without any formal action by other
nation states.1" The constitutive approach is that an entity becomes a
state through recognition by other states, regardless of whether that
entity meets these four objective requirements.1 2 Traditionally, Pales-
tine did not meet the objective requirements of the declaratory
approach.1
3
First, Palestine could not traditionally meet the requirement of a
defined territory. What territory is Palestine remains the source of bit-
ter conflict. 4 Palestinians lost territory in the Arab-Israeli wars of
1948 and 1967."s Does the territory of Palestine include only the lands
also id. § 205 cmt. a (explaining that the denial of access to the courts is binding on the fifty
states). See infra part V. for further discussion concerning the effect of statehood for Palestine on
international and United States law.
9. See generally Prince, supra note 5.
10. These four requirements are found in the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties
of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, T.I.A.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. For the United
States' view, see RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra, note 7, § 201 (providing the
same four requirements of statehood as the Montevideo Convention).
11. For a discussion of the declaratory approach to statehood, see Deborah L. Alexander,
Comment, Recognition in International Law: A Functional Reappraisal, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 857,
861-863 (1967).
12. For a discussion of the constitutive approach to statehood, see id. at 859-861.
13. The declaratory approach to the impact of recognition on statehood is the approach taken
by the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 202 cmt. b.
However, the Restatement explains that as a practical matter, an entity would need recognition
from a significant number of states to fully enjoy the benefits of statehood. Id. The Restatement
also adopts the view that a state is required to "treat as a state" an entity that meets the
requirements of section 201. Id. § 202(1). Section 201 of the Restatement adopts the four
requirements of the declaratory approach to statehood. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Thus, the distinction between the declaratory and constitutive approaches may have
diminished considerably. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 202
reporter's note 1 (explaining that the practical differences between the two approaches have grown
smaller and that the duty of states to treat as a state entities that meet the formal requirements of
statehood has been adopted in several international agreements).
14. See Prince, supra note 5, at 686-90 (describing the disagreement, even among
Palestinians, concerning whether a Palestinian state should encompass all of historic Palestine or
merely include the West Bank and Gaza Strip).
15. The lands Palestinians lost in 1967 are the West Bank, the Gaza strip, and the Sinai
Peninsula. JoHN QIUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE 163 (1990).
For a discussion of the lands lost in the 1948 war, see generally id. at 57-65. For an illustration of
the 1948 and 1967 boundary lines, see RiTCHIE OVENDALE, THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI
WARS 214 (1984).
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lost in 1967? Or does it include those lost in 1948 as well? What does
it mean for Israel if part of its land is claimed by Palestine? Because no
consensus existed on these issues, Palestine could not satisfy the
requirement of a defined territory.
Second, the enormous amount of refugees from the two wars of
1948 and 1967 prevented Palestine from meeting the requirement of a
permanent population.16 Half the Palestinian Arabs became refugees
after the 1948 war.1 7 Two hundred thousand more Palestinians became
refugees after the 1967 war.' 8 Whether the population of Palestine
included both sets of refugees, or one, or none, was unclear. Thus,
Palestine could not define its permanent population.
Third, historically, Palestine could not meet the requirement of an
authority exercising governmental functions.19 The PLO did not gov-
ern the basic, daily lives of the Palestinians living in the occupied terri-
tories, or those of the refugees from the 1948 and 1967 wars. Israeli
occupation forces controlled these functions.20 Thus, Palestine did not
have an authority exercising governmental functions.
Fourth, although Palestine had achieved to some degree the capac-
ity to conduct foreign relations,2 it could not definitely meet this
requirement. For example, the PLO had observer status at the United
Nations, 22 and recognition by over one hundred nations.23 However,
some commentators have suggested that an entity's capacity to conduct
international relations is rendered meaningless if the entity is unable to
implement international obligations.24 Even though the PLO may
16. There are 2.2 million registered Palestinian refugees. Eur. Pan. Ass., 40th Sess., Doc.
No. 5956 (1988).
17. MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 238.
18. Id. at 274.
19. The language of the Restatement regarding this requirement states "under the control of
its own government." RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 201. However,
comment d to § 201 provides: "A state need not have any particular form of government, but
there must be some authority exercising governmental functions and able to represent the entity in
international relations." Id. cmt. d.
20. For a discussion of the control of government functions in the West bank and Gaza strip
after the 1967 war, see Prince, supra note 6, at 694 (quoting Evyatar Levine, A Landmark on the
Road to Legal Chaos: Recognition of the PLO as a Menace to World Public Order, 10 DENY. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 243, 248 (1981)).
21. The capacity to conduct foreign relations includes the competence within an entity's own
constitutional system, as well as the political, technical, and financial competence to conduct
international relations. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 201 crnt. e.
22. See G.A. Res. 3237, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 5, U.N. Doc A/9631
(1974) (granting observer status to the Palestinian Liberation Organization).
23. See Anis F. Kassim, The Palestinian Liberation Organization's Claim to Status: A
Juridical Analysis Under International Law, 9 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 19-20 (1980).
24. For an analysis of the effect of the competence to implement international obligations on
the capacity to conduct international relations requirement, see JAMES CRAWFoRD, THE
CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 47 (1979).
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have represented Palestine in the international community, it lacked the
capacity to bind Palestinians to international obligations. The capacity
to bind Palestinians to international obligations is frustrated because
Israel controls the territory claimed to be Palestine and the people liv-
ing there.
Therefore, statehood for Palestine could not be established under
the declaratory theory. It is possible, however, to argue for Palestinian
statehood based on the constitutive theory, government-in-exile status,
or belligerent status. However, to base Palestinian statehood on the
constitutive theory presents the problem of a recognized Palestine that
could not meet the objective requirements of statehood.2" Govern-
ment-in-exile status for Palestine is inappropriate because it creates
dual loyalties for Palestinian refugees who now reside in another
state. 26 Belligerent status, derived from the international law of war,
27
is also inappropriate because the PLO is not in control of many diverse
elements, which indicates a lack of competence to control its own
forces.28 Thus, none of these alternative theories provide a satisfactory
basis for claiming statehood for Palestine.
However, the Declaration of Principles presents an opportunity to
reevaluate the traditional view of Palestine. This Comment examines
the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles and its effect on the changing
legal status of Palestine. Although the provisions of the Declaration do
25. For an analysis of the effects of premature recognition of states, see Prince, supra note 5,
at 703-705 (quoting HERSH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-8
(1947)).
26. Kassim, supra note 23, at 32. Dual loyalties would exist because Palestinians would owe
a loyalty to the government that "hosts" the refugees, as well as to a Palestinian government in
exile. See id. Such concerns surfaced in September 1993 when Jordan's King Hussein announced
that Jordanians of Palestinian descent would have to choose between practicing their political
rights in Jordan or the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Lamis Andoni, Troubled by Israeli-PLO Peace
Plan, Jordan's Ruler to Delay Elections, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, Sept. 28, 1993, at 7. For
further analysis of the PLO's claim to government-in-exile status, see generally William V.
O'Brien, The PLO in International Law, 2 B.U. INT'L L.J. 349 (1984).
27. O'Brien, supra note 26, at 351, 398-402, provides an analysis of the status of the PLO as
a belligerent force. The general requirements of belligerent status are:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
War.
Id. at 399 (citing the 1949 Geneva Convention III, Article 4). Although O'Brien argues that
exceptions have been made to this general rule, and that the PLO can be termed a belligerent
because its forces receive POW status from Israel, see id. at 405, the O'Brien analysis is an exam-
ple of how difficult it is to claim belligerent status for the PLO because historically the actions of
the PLO were more terrorist than military, and because the PLO had only loose command of its
forces. See id. at 403.
28. See id.
1994]
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provide steps toward establishing the requirements of statehood for
Palestine, the Declaration does not establish a state of Palestine during
the five-year interim period of autonomy. However, it is possible that
a state of Palestine could exist after the interim period.
Part II of this Comment describes the provisions of the Declara-
tion that are relevant to statehood for Palestine and determines the legal
classification of the Declaration. Part II concludes that the Declaration
is not a treaty because it is not an international agreement between
states. However, the Declaration of Principles does have a binding
nature. Israel can bind itself to the provisions of the Declaration
because international law provides that unilateral statements are bind-
ing on states. Part II concludes that the Declaration may require com-
pliance because of reciprocal political obligations.
Part III contains an analysis of how the Declaration of Principles
affects the legal status of Palestine during the interim period. Part III
concludes that although the Declaration takes significant steps toward
establishing a state of Palestine, it falls short of this during the interim
period. Part III argues that efforts to establish a defined territory and
an authority exercising governmental functions have not been signifi-
cant or clear enough to establish these two requirements. Further, the
refugee problem continues to prohibit Palestine from defining a perma-
nent population. Lastly, although the PLO has represented the Pales-
tinian people internationally, the Declaration is not clear whether the
PLO may conduct foreign relations for the territory contemplated in
the Declaration of Principles.
Part IV examines the legal status of Palestine after the interim
period. Part IV argues that whether a Palestinian state is established
after the interim period will largely depend on Palestinian conduct dur-
ing the interim period. Although the Declaration provides an interim
period mechanism, Permanent Status Negotiations, for resolving the
problems that remain for Palestinian statehood, the Declaration does
not make clear whether Israel and the PLO can agree to solve these
problems through that mechanism. Part IV concludes by providing
some solutions to the remaining obstacles to Palestinian statehood.
Part V presents areas of United States law that could be affected if
a state of Palestine is established. Many United States practices
towards the PLO, regarding sovereign immunity or the standing of a
government to sue in United States courts, are dependent on the tradi-
tional view of Palestine.29 These United States practices require an
evaluation of whether an entity is a state under the objective require-
29. For example, a 1991 U.S. Court of Appeals decision, Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille
Lauro, held that the PLO could not claim immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
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ments of the declaratory approach to statehood.30 Because Palestine
could not meet the objective requirements of the declaratory approach,
it did not receive the benefits of statehood under United States law. A
change in the legal status of Palestine, however, would require a change
in these traditional practices. Further, a change in the legal status of
Palestine will affect political decisions regarding United States involve-
ment with Palestinians and the role of the PLO in the United States."t
II. THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
Part II first describes the provisions of the Israeli-PLO Declara-
tion of Principles relevant to statehood. The provisions of the Declara-
tion relevant to statehood will be important to a subsequent
examination of how the provisions affect the changing legal status of
Palestine. Part II then examines the legal classification of the Declara-
tion of Principles. The legal classification of the Declaration is impor-
tant in determining how binding the provisions of the Declaration are,
and in determining how the Declaration will change the legal status of
Palestine.
A. The Provisions of the Declaration
Section A of Part II describes the provisions of the Israeli-PLO
Declaration of Principles relevant to Palestinian statehood. The Decla-
ration of Principles provides for Palestinian self-rule, for Israeli with-
drawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, for a committee to decide the
fate of Palestinian refugees, for the establishment of Palestinian
Authorities, and for the establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian Contin-
uing Committee for Economic Cooperation.32
The provisions of the Declaration leading toward Palestinian self-
rule include those establishing the Palestinian Interim Self-Govern-
ment Authority [hereinafter "Council"] .3 Within nine months of the
signing of the Declaration, free and general political elections will be
held to establish the Council.34 The Declaration provides for a later
election agreement to establish the system of elections, the mode of
agreed supervision and international observation, and the rules and
because it was not a state. 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991). The court used the requirements of the
declaratory approach to statehood to make that determination. See id. at 47.
30. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 205.
31. Political decisions could include foreign policy decisions regarding negotiations with the
PLO, classifying the PLO as a terrorist organization for purposes of trade with Palestinians, or
decisions regarding the immigration of Palestinians.
32. Ford, supra note 2.
33. Declaration, supra note 4, art. I.
34. Id. art. 111(1-2).
1994]
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regulations regarding election campaigns. 3 The jurisdiction of the
Council will cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory.3 6 However,
the jurisdiction of the Council will not extend to those issues that will
be negotiated in the Permanent Status Negotiations: Jerusalem, settle-
ments, military locations, and Israelis.37
Before the Council is elected, PLO-nominated Palestinians will
take responsibility from Israel in the areas of education and culture,
health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism.3' The Declaration
further calls for the building of a Palestinian police force39 to guarantee
public order and internal security. Until the Council is elected, Israel
will retain power over foreign affairs, external security, and the Jewish
settlements.40
The Declaration calls for Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip
and Jericho beginning immediately, and complete withdrawal in four
months.41 Further, it calls for an agreement within two months of the
signing of the Declaration to cover the withdrawal, including compre-
hensive arrangements subsequent to the withdrawal.42
Provisions of the Declaration address Palestinian refugees. The
Declaration provides for a Continuing Committee, in which Jordan and
Egypt are invited to participate, to determine the "modalities of admis-
sion of persons -displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in
1967."43
The Declaration establishes Palestinian Authorities. Upon inau-
guration, the Council will establish a Palestinian Electric Authority, a
Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestin-
35. Id. annex 1(2).
36. Id. art. IV. (explaining the jurisdiction of the Council).
37. See id. art. V(3). (explaining the remaining issues to be discussed in Permanent Status
Negotiations).
38. Id. art. VI(2).
39. Id.
40. Id. annex II(3)(b). Annex II provides for an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli
forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. Section (3)(b) explains that the agreement will
include "[s]tructure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas,
except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed upon
matters." Id. This section can be taken to mean that these issues will not be handled in this
agreement, as security arrangements and settlements will be discussed in Permanent Status
Negotiations. Id. art. V(3). However, the Declaration provides that the withdrawal referred to in
annex II will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to
the Council. Id. Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles in Interim Self-Government
Arrangements, part B, art. VII(S). Thus, it can be inferred that the foreign affairs power referred
to in annex II remains with Israel during the interim period. For more discussion on the
provisions of the Declaration dealing with foreign affairs see infra part III.D.
41. Declaration, supra note 4, annex 11(2).
42. Id. annex 11(1).
43. Id. art. XII.
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ian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a
Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration
Authority. 44 Finally, the Declaration calls for an Israeli-Palestinian
Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing on cooper-
ation in the areas of water, electricity, energy, finance, transportation,
communication, and trade.45
B. The Legal Classification of the Declaration
Section B of Part II examines the legal classification of the Decla-
ration of Principles. Section B concludes that the Declaration is not a
treaty because it is not an international agreement between states.
However, Israel can bind itself to the provisions of the Declaration
because international law provides, as this Section shows, that unilat-
eral statements are binding on states. Further, the Declaration may
require compliance because of reciprocal political obligations.46
International law provides several possibilities for classification of
the Declaration of Principles. These possibilities include treaty, inter-
national agreement, unilateral statements, and political obligations.
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides
that a treaty is an international agreement that is between states, in
written form, and governed by international law. 47 Article 26 of the
Vienna Convention provides that every treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.4 8
The Declaration of Principles is not a treaty. The PLO was not a
state when the Declaration of Principles was signed.49 Further, the
Declaration does not clearly provide that it shall be governed by inter-
national law.50 Thus, the Declaration does not meet the requirements
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Declaration is
not an international agreement between states and does not provide
that it shall be governed by international law. Because the Declaration
does not meet these two requirements, it does not fall under Article 26
44. Id. art. VII(4).
45. Id. annex III.
46. The phrase "reciprocal political obligations" is not used in this Comment as a legal term
of art. The term is used here to describe those situations where parties agree to perform or abstain
from activities in exchange for another party's agreement to perform or abstain from activities.
Thus, even though a party in such a situation may not believe they are legally bound to perform,
they may do so in the hopes that the second party will continue to perform.
47. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
48. Id. art. 26.
49. For an analysis of the legal status of Palestine and the PLO before the Declaration of
Principles, see generally Prince, supra note S.
50. See Declaration, supra note 4, art. XV (providing for disputes to be resolved by Joint
Committee or by arbitration).
1994]
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of the Vienna Convention (which would make the Declaration binding
and impose on both parties a good faith standard). Although the Dec-
laration of Principles is not binding on the parties as provided in Arti-
cle 26 of the Vienna Convention, it does create obligations for the
parties under international law.
First, the Declaration contains language indicating that the agree-
ment is intended to be legally binding and to have legal consequences
in Article XV concerning the resolution of Israeli-PLO disputes.-"
Article XV contains provisions for disputes to be resolved by the Joint
Liaison Committee, or by arbitration. 2  While these provisions
include language that the Declaration is intended to be binding, they
do not provide how the decisions of the Joint Liaison Committee or the
arbitration panel will be enforced against the PLO or Israel. Article
XV of the Declaration states that an Arbitration Committee will be
established by the parties to settle disputes that cannot be resolved
through the Joint Liaison Committee or through conciliation. 3 Arti-
cle XV does not state how the Arbitration Committee will enforce its
decisions. Thus, although it is clear that the parties intended the Decla-
ration to be binding because they provided a method of dispute resolu-
tion, it is less clear whether any panel requested by the PLO or Israel,
will have the ability to enforce any obligation the Declaration may
create. 5
4
Second, international law provides that international agreements
do not require consideration." Binding unilateral statements by states
are therefore possible. The International Court of Justice recognized
this possibility in its decision in the Nuclear Tests Case. 6 The court
held that "declarations made by way of unilateral acts ... may have the
effect of creating legal obligations. 5s7 The court stated that such state-
ments would be binding if made publicly, and with an intent to be
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. XV(3).
54. For example, it is unclear whether the PLO would be able to enforce Israeli withdrawal
from areas agreed to in the Declaration.
55. For the United States' view see RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7,
§ 301 cmt. c (explaining that international agreements do not require consideration and may be
wholly unilateral).
56. Nuclear Tests (Aust. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267 (Dec. 20). Nuclear Tests involved the
unilateral statements of the French Foreign Minister concerning atmospheric nuclear testing. Id.
at 268. For a discussion of international law on unilateral statements and Nuclear Tests, see
generally Alfred P. Rubin, The International Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations, 71 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 3-28 (1977).
57. Nuclear Tests, supra note 56, at 267.
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bound."8 However, a restrictive interpretation is called for when states
make statements that limit their freedom of action.5 9
Because Israel is a state, it can bind itself to the provisions of the
Declaration through its unilateral statements, even though the Declara-
tion does not rise to the level of a treaty under the Vienna Conven-
tion.6" Israel's unilateral statements are binding if Israel manifests an
intent to be bound, and does so publicly. Although the provisions of
the Declaration are public, the intent to be bound requirement poses a
problem. There is language in the Declaration that indicates that Israel
and the PLO intended the Declaration to be legally binding, but the
language does not indicate how the Declaration will be enforced. 6 If
Israel intended the language to be ambiguous, then Israel has not
clearly manifested an intent to be bound. Israel may have intended that
the Declaration not be enforceable, regardless of how binding the lan-
guage of the Declaration may sound.
The distinction between statements that indicate an intent to be
bound and the lack of any enforcement mechanism is important
because of the International Court of Justice's language in the Nuclear
Test Case. The Court suggested that a restrictive interpretation of uni-
lateral statements should be applied when states make statements that
limit their freedom of action.62 A restrictive interpretation of the lan-
guage in the Declaration could lead to the conclusion that, because
there is no suggestion of enforcement, Israel never meant to legally bind
itself. Israel could have intended not to legally bind itself, even though
it chose to agree to the binding language. However, the language pro-
viding for dispute resolution,63 the length and comprehensive nature of
the Declaration,64 and the negotiations leading to the signing of the




60. Because unilateral statements are binding on states, it may be difficult to apply the
"unilateral statements" doctrine to the PLO because it was not a state at the time of the signing of
the Declaration. The question of whether an agreement to create a state from an entity would
serve to make that entity a state for the purposes of the state-creating agreement is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
61. Declaration, supra note 4, art. XV(3). Section 3 contains language concerning dispute
resolution but does not provide an enforcement mechanism. Id.
62. Nuclear Tests, supra note 56, at 267.
63. Declaration, supra note 4, art. XV(3).
64. The Declaration of Principles contains seventeen articles and four annexes. It
encompasses finance, transport, energy, elections, regional programs, Israeli withdrawal, public
order and security, and provides for specific remaining issues to be discussed in Permanent Status
Negotiations. See Declaration, supra note 4.
65. The Declaration was the result of 14 secret meetings in Norway. Ford, supra note 2.
1994]
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Third, Israel and Palestine may comply with the Declaration
because of their reciprocal political obligations. The obligations created
by the Declaration are conditional: the land from Israel in exchange for
promises by the PLO to denounce terrorism.66 Thus, Israel and Pales-
tine have an incentive to maintain their obligations under the Declara-
tion because they want to promote compliance by the other party.
Therefore, the Declaration does have a binding nature. While the
Declaration is not between states, it does contain language providing
66. Following are letters from Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Hoist
of Norway and from Mr. Rabin to Mr. Arafat. The letters were provided by Mr. Rabin's office




In response to your letter of Sept. 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that in light of
the P.L.O. commitments included in your letter the Government of Israel has decided
to recognize the P.L.O. as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence
negotiations with the P.L.O. within the Middle East peace process.
YITZHAK RABIN




The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the
Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following P.L.O.
commitments:
The P.L.O. recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.
The P.L.O. accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
The P.L.O. commits itself to the Middle East peace process and to a peaceful
resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues
relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.
The P.L.O. considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a
historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and
all other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the P.L.O. renounces
the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all
P.L.O. elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations
and discipline violators.
In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the Declaration of Principles
and based on Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the
P.L.O. affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right
to exist and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the
commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the
P.L.O. undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the
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for dispute resolution. Further, the Declaration is binding on Israel
because unilateral statements are binding on states. In addition, the
promises of Israel and the PLO are conditional. Therefore, the condi-
tional nature of the Declaration suggests that the parties will seriously
attempt to comply. As a result, it is likely that many provisions of the
Declaration will take effect. Parts III and IV examine how compliance
with specific provisions will affect claims of Palestinian statehood.
III. STATUS OF PALESTINE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD
Part III contains an analysis of how the Israeli-PLO Declaration
of Principles affects the legal status of Palestine during the five year
interim period of autonomy provided for in the Declaration. Interna-
tional law provides that to be a state, an entity must have a defined
territory, a permanent population, an authority exercising governmen-
tal functions and a capacity to conduct international relations.67 While
the Declaration of Principles does take significant steps toward estab-
lishing these requirements for Palestine, it leaves too many issues
unresolved to establish a state of Palestine during the interim period.
Part III concludes that the requirements necessary to establish state-
hood under the declaratory theory6 are not met during the interim
period.
A. The Requirement of a Defined Territory
During the interim period, Palestine will be close to satisfying the
requirement of a defined territory because the Declaration of Principles




I would like to confirm to you that upon the signing of the Declaration of Principles
I will include the following positions in my public statements:
In light of the new era marked by the signing of the Declaration of Principles the
P.L.O. encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and
terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participating actively in shaping





Three Letters That Sealed the Diplomatic Bargain, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 10, 1993, at A12. Copyright
© 1993 by the New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.
67. See supra note 10 for this codification in international law and the United States' view on
the requirements of statehood.
68. See Alexander, supra note 11, for an analysis of the declaratory theory of statehood.
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Gaza Strip.6 9 However, any claim to a Palestinian state in a defined
territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is frustrated by language in
the Declaration that leaves several territorial issues to be discussed in
Permanent Status Negotiations, and leaves Israeli withdrawal incom-
plete.70 The remaining territorial issues to be discussed in the Perma-
nent Status Negotiations include Jerusalem, Jewish settlements,
security arrangements, and borders.71 Furthermore, even though the
jurisdiction of the Council includes West Bank and Gaza Strip terri-
tory, Israeli withdrawal only extends to the Gaza Strip and Jericho
areas. Thus, withdrawal does not extend to the entire West Bank.72
The unresolved territorial issues present important jurisdictional
problems for any Palestinian state established in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip areas for three reasons. First, the Declaration is unclear
whether the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas
will (1) eventually be turned over to the jurisdiction of the Council, (2)
remain areas within the boundaries of a Palestinian territory still gov-
erned by Israel, or (3) eventually come under a joint rule arrangement.
Thus, the Declaration does not determine whether the territory occu-
pied by the Jewish settlements will eventually become part of the
defined territory of Palestine.
The second territorial issue involves resolution of the status of
Jerusalem. Although a Palestinian state would not necessarily have to
include Jerusalem, an agreement indicating its status would help define
the territory contemplated for Palestine.
Third, the issues of security arrangements and borders are signifi-
cant to any establishment of a defined territory because the Declaration
does not rule out maintaining areas of heavy occupation by Israeli
forces to enforce a border arrangement or security. Because such occu-
pation is not ruled out, territory to come under the Palestinian Coun-
cil's jurisdiction could include areas heavily occupied by Israeli forces.
Moreover, language in the Declaration calling for Israeli withdrawal
only from the Gaza Strip and Jericho supports the possibility of Israeli
69. See Declaration, supra note 4, art. IV.
70. See id. annex II. Annex II provides only for Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and
Jericho. Id. annex 11(1).
71. Id. art. V(3).
72. Id. annex 11(1).
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occupation.7 3 Areas heavily occupied by Israeli forces can only loosely
be considered part of the territory of a Palestinian state.74
The PLO could argue that the territory of a Palestinian state is
sufficiently defined during the interim period to satisfy the territorial
requirement. Their argument has support from the comment to the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, section
201, which states that "[a]n entity may satisfy the territorial require-
ment for statehood even if its boundaries have not been finally settled,
if one or more of its boundaries are disputed, or if some of its territory
is claimed by another state.""5 Thus, the United States' view does not
indicate that the boundary issues would have to be finally settled
between Israel and Palestine to satisfy the requirement of a defined
territory. Thus, the PLO could argue that although the issues of bor-
ders, settlements, and Jerusalem remain open, the territory of Palestine
is sufficiently defined because the Declaration broadly states that it
contemplates West Bank and Gaza Strip territory to come under the
jurisdiction of the Council.
However, the Restatement is only an expression of the United
States' view.7 6 Further, the language "West Bank and Gaza Strip terri-
tory" is far too vague, and far too broad, to supply any indication of
what territory is contemplated for a Palestinian state. Lastly, the
problems associated with the unresolved territorial issues during the
interim period are far too many, and far too significant, to conclude
that any defined territory has been established.77 The Declaration has
taken significant steps towards establishing a defined territory by indi-
cating the territory will be in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However,
the defined territory requirement is not met because a number of issues
73. See id. Subsequent negotiations between Israel and the PLO were stalled because of the
security arrangements, border issues, and Israeli withdrawal. See Jonathan Wright, PLO- Israeli
Talks on Self-Rule Enter Third Day, REUTEs, Jan. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
WIRES File.
74. The Restatement proposes the view that military occupation does not terminate statehood.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 201, reporters' notes 3 (providing the
examples of Germany's occupation of European states during World War II, or the subsequent
occupation of Germany). However, unlike the significance of military occupation to the
termination of statehood, the significance of military occupation in the Middle East is that
occupation makes difficult the determination of the boundaries of any territory belonging to a
Palestinian state if that territory is "occupied" by Israel.
75. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 201, cmt. b.
76. The Restatement is an expression of the foreign relations law of the United States. Thus,
the Restatement interpretation of the requirement of a defined territory is the view of the United
States. International law generally may not interpret the requirements of the Montevidio
Convention, see supra note 10, in the same way. However, the Restatement is an indication of how
courts in the United States might interpret this requirement.
77. See Wright, supa note 73, for examples of delays in the negotiations on these same
issues.
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regarding a defined territory are left unresolved during the interim
period.
B. The Requirement of a Permanent Population
The requirement that, to be a state, an entity must have a popula-
tion that is significant and permanent is not met during the interim
period because the problem of the refugees from the 1948 and 1967
wars remains.18
The Declaration does not clearly provide whether the refugees
from the 1948 and 1967 wars are included in the permanent population
of Palestine. Whether "refugees" includes both sets of refugees, or
one, or neither, has not clearly been stated in the Declaration.79
There is language in the Declaration from which the PLO could
argue that the permanent population requirement is satisfied. For
example, Article XII of the Declaration includes language that contem-
plates participation of the 1967 refugees, but not participation of the
refugees from 1948. Article XII, which concerns liaison and coopera-
tion with Jordan and Egypt, 0 states that a Continuing Committee will
decide on the "modalities of admission of persons displaced from the
West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967. ' ' "1 Annex I of the Declaration,
concerning elections, states that the status of "displaced Palestinians
who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced. '8 2 Thus,
Article XII and Annex I appear to include only the Palestinian refugees
from 1967 in the population of a Palestinian state.
Because the refugee problem is addressed in Article XII and
Annex I without reference to the 1948 refugees, the PLO could argue
that the 1948 refugees have been specifically left out of any Palestinian
population. Thus, the PLO could argue that the requirement of a sig-
nificant and permanent population is resolved.
However, this argument fails because it overlooks several sections
of the Declaration of Principles which refer to refugees in generic terms
without regard to whether the 1948 refugees are included. For exam-
ple, Article V includes refugees in the remaining issues to be resolved
78. For an explanation of the refugee problem see supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
79. See Declaration, supra note 4. Examples include Article V, which includes refugees in
the remaining issues to be covered by the Permanent Status Negotiations, and Annex II(3)(c),
which provides for Palestinians from abroad to be included in the Palestinian police force.
80. Jordan hosts the biggest concentration of Palestinian refugees. Anondi, supra note 26.
Over one half of the population of Jordan is of Palestinian origin. Id. There are also an estimated
120,000 refugees in Egypt. Deborah Pugh, Palestinians in Egypt Weary of Restrictions, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, September 28, 1993, at 7.
81. Id. art. XII.
82. Id. annex 1(3).
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by the Permanent Status Negotiations, and does not specifically
exclude the 1948 refugees.8 3 Similarly, Annex II(3)(c) provides for
Palestinians from abroad to be included in the Palestinian police force,
and does not specifically exclude the 1948 refugees.8 4
Further, the Declaration's reference to United Nations Security
Council Resolution 24285 leads to the inference that Israel and Pales-
tine did not intend to exclude the 1948 refugees. Security Council Res-
olution 242, enacted in 1967, refers to a "just settlement of the refugee
problem."8 6 This statement does not distinguish between the refugees
from 1967 and those from 1948.
In addition, Resolution 242 indicates that the Security Council
could distinguish between problems arising from the 1967 conflict and
the 1948 conflict. Resolution 242 calls for Israeli withdrawal from
"territories occupied in the recent conflict."8 7 As it is worded, the Res-
olution appears to omit territories acquired in the 1948 conflict. In
distinguishing between the territories acquired in the 1967 and 1948
conflicts, the Security Council recognized the different territory
problems involved in those conflicts. Thus, despite its demonstrated
ability to distinguish between the two conflicts, the Security Council
chose to call for a settlement of the refugee problem, without referring to
the refugees from the 1948 conflict or the refugees from the recent
conflict.
Even if the Security Council did not intend a distinction between
the 1967 and 1948 refugees, Resolution 242 was enacted in 1967, when
the refugee problem from the 1967 war was just beginning to be under-
stood.88 Resolution 242 could be referring specifically to the refugees
from 1948 and excluding the 1967 refugees. Thus, by stating that one
of the aims of the peace negotiations is the implementation of Security
Council Resolution 242,89 the refugee language in the Declaration of
Principles may refer to "achieving a just settlement of the refugee prob-
lem," including the 1948 refugees.
83. Id. art. V(3).
84. Id. annex II(3)(c).
85. See id. art. I. Article I of the Declaration of Principles calls for the implementation of
Security Council Resolution 242. Id. For an explanation of this Security Council Resolution, see
supra note 5.
86. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1382d mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/Rev.2
(1968).
87. Security Council Resolution 242 was enacted in 1968. Id. The "recent" conflict was
therefore the 1967 conflict.
88. For an analysis of the Palestinian refugee problem, and its growth after the 1948 and
1967 wars, see generally Eur. Parl. Ass., supra note 16.
89. Declaration, supra note 4, art. I.
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Although the Declaration does appear to include the 1967 refugees
in sections that leave out the 1948 refugees, other sections of the Decla-
ration indicate that the question of which refugees are included in the
permanent population of Palestine is unresolved.
C. The Requirement of an Authority Exercising Governmental
Functions
The requirement that, to be a state, an entity must have an author-
ity exercising governmental functions is not met during the interim
period.9" Some responsibilities are turned over to the Council during
the interim period. However, numerous areas of governing are either
left open, left to multi-lateral discussion, or left to Israel, indicating that
the Palestinians will not assume complete governing authority over Pal-
estinian territory during the interim period.
The areas of authority transferred to the Palestinians during the
interim period include education and culture, health, social welfare,
direct taxation, tourism, and some police powers.9 1 Further, the Coun-
cil is given power during the interim period to legislate,92 and to estab-
lish judicial organs.9 3 The' Interim Agreement calls for the
establishment of a Palestinian Electric Authority, a Gaza Sea Port
Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Pro-
motion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian
Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority. 4
Thus, the PLO could argue that the areas of transferred authority are
significant governmental functions, and that the authority transferred
under the Declaration alone satisfies the governmental function
requirement. However, this argument ignores other specific areas not
turned over to the Palestinians.
The first area of government authority not turned over to the
Palestinians includes those authorities that are left for further discus-
sion during the interim period. These authorities include security
arrangements, borders, and certain police powers.9s The ability to
make security arrangements, and the ability to monitor borders are nec-
essary governmental functions that an entity claiming statehood should
90. The language in the Restatement for this requirement is "under the control of its own
government." RESTATEMFNT OF FOREIGN RELATiONs, supra note 7, § 201. However, the
comment to the Restatement provides that "[a] state need not have any particular form of
government, but there must be some authority exercising governmental functions and able to
represent the entity in international relations." Id. cmt. d.
91. Declaration, supra note 4, art. VI(2).
92. Id. art. IX(1).
93. Id. art. VII(2).
94. Id. art. VII(4).
95. See id. arts. V, VIII.
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possess. They are necessary because these powers help promote the
territorial integrity of a state. Further, because the territory of Pales-
tine is ambiguous in the Declaration,96 any Palestinian authority over
these disputed areas, or Palestinian authority necessary to establish rule
over these areas, is left unresolved.
The second area of governmental authority not turned over to the
Palestinians includes governmental authority left to bi-lateral or multi-
lateral discussion or rule. These authorities include refugee decision-
making,97 international observation of elections,9 a temporary interna-
tional presence with regard to the withdrawal of Israeli forces,99 and an
Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic Coopera-
tion. 00 The international observation of elections and possible interna-
tional presence 0 1 regarding Israeli withdrawal present problems for
any Palestinian assumption of police powers. Vhile these measures
may be temporarily necessary to promote peace and stability, interna-
tional participation detracts from the Palestinians' ability to provide
order, peace and stability themselves. If the Palestinian police force
cannot provide internal order, it is questionable whether the Palestinian
police force could be effective in exercising police powers.
Although the Palestinians will have authorities established to deal
with water, energy, finance, and the sea port,10 2 the Declaration states
that the Authorities will work with the Continuing Committee for Eco-
nomic Cooperation in these areas. 10 3 Such cooperation raises the ques-
tion of whether the Palestinian Authorities will actually assume control
of water, energy, finance, and the seaport, or whether most matters will
be resolved as part of the Continuing Committee's responsibilities.
The Palestinian Authorities could assume control over these areas, but
must work with the Continuing Committee in ways to promote cooper-
ation between Israel and Palestine. If the Continuing Committee
merely promotes cooperation, the Palestinians will have actually
assumed the governmental authority necessary in this area. However,
the language of the Declaration does not provide a clear answer.
Therefore, how this arrangement will work in practice during the
interim period remains to be seen.
96. Id. art. V(3) (leaving the geographic areas of Jerusalem and the Jewish settlements open
to discussion at the Permanent Status Negotiations).
97. Id. art. XII.
98. Id. art. III(1).
99. Id. annex II(3)(d).
100. Id. art. XII.
101. See id. annex II(3)(d).
102. Id. art. VII(4).
103. Id. annex III.
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A third area of governmental authority not turned over to Pales-
tinians is governmental authority left to Israel by the Declaration. This
authority includes the authority (1) to deal with external threats, (2) to
maintain the security of Israelis, (3) to deal with foreign relations in the
area, and (4) to re-deploy troops outside populated areas.10 4 Further,
the Declaration contains a clause that states "[t]he withdrawal of the
military government will not prevent Israel from exercising powers and
responsibilities not transferred to the Council."' ' Any powers not
turned over to Palestine remain with Israel. The powers that remain
with Israel prevent Palestine from obtaining complete government
authority necessary for statehood for two reasons.
First, the re-deployment of Israeli troops in the West Bank and
Jericho areas could seriously undermine the Palestinian police power.
It would be undermined because Israeli troops could continue to be the
force maintaining peace and stability. Further, even if Israeli 'troops do
defer to Palestinian police power in these territories, the Palestinian
police power would be undermined because complete Palestinian con-
trol would be lacking. Second, foreign affairs power over the West
Bank and Jericho areas that is not turned over to Palestinian control is
an important governmental power. It is important because without this
power, a Palestinian state in these areas would answer to Israel in the
area of foreign affairs.
Thus, although some governmental powers are transferred to the
Palestinians, the transferred powers do not rise to the level of an
authority exercising governmental functions. While the transfer of
power presents a significant step towards the type of authority neces-
sary to satisfy the requirement of an authority exercising governmental
functions, the powers retained, left open, or transferred to multi-lateral
negotiation, prevent that authority from becoming complete.
D. The Requirement of the Capacity to Conduct Foreign Relations
An entity, to be a state, must have the capacity to conduct foreign
relations.10 6 The capacity to conduct foreign relations includes compe-
tence within an entity's own constitutional system, as well as political,
technical, and financial competence to conduct international rela-
tions.10 7 The requirement of the capacity to conduct foreign relations
104. See id. annex II(3)(b), art. XIII(2).
105. Id. Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government
Arrangements, part B, art. VII(S).
106. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 201.
107. For an explanation of the source of these requirements in international law, see supra
note 10. This definition of the capacity to conduct foreign relations comes from the United States
view, found in the RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supa note 7, § 201 (1987).
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has traditionally been the least problematic requirement of statehood
for Palestine. l"' However, the language in the Declaration could frus-
trate claims by the PLO that it has the capacity to conduct foreign
relations for the territory contemplated to come under Palestinian rule.
Annex II of the Declaration contemplates an agreement between
the PLO and Israel concerning Israeli military withdrawal.109 The text
states that the contemplated agreement will include the structure, pow-
ers, and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, with
the exception of foreign relations.110 Removing the subject of foreign
relations from the agreement to withdraw presents a problem because it
suggests Israeli control of foreign relations power for the area covered
by the Declaration. Furthermore, the withdrawal agreement [hereinaf-
ter Gaza-Jericho Agreement], signed on May 4, 1994, expressly stated
that the Palestinian Authorities will not have powers and responsibili-
ties in the sphere of foreign relations."1 ' Although the PLO has tradi-
tionally been the voice for the Palestinian people, its ability to speak for
Palestinians in the territory that will come under Palestinian self-rule is
restrained by the language of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement.
The ability to conduct foreign relations for the territory covered
by the Declaration could be construed to include border disputes with
nations other than Israel, presence of foreign troops other than Israeli,
and possible international agreements involving use of the territory.
Even if this language is interpreted to mean that Israel retains foreign
affairs power for that territory covered by the Gaza-Jericho Agreement
only, and not the general foreign affairs power of the PLO, the power
of foreign affairs for the Palestinians over territory contemplated for
their rule is seriously limited.
The language of Annex II of the Declaration, however, points
towards Palestine assuming foreign relations power. First, the language
of Annex II could be interpreted to mean that Israel retains power over
foreign relations in that territory with regard to the withdrawal or deploy-
ment of Israeli forces because the reservation of foreign relations power
is included in that section of the Declaration.1 2 Second, the language
of Annex II could be interpreted to mean that the transfer of foreign
108. For the traditional view of Palestine, see generally Prince, supra note 5. For a specific
discussion of the capacity of the PLO to conduct foreign relations, see id. at 685-98.
109. See Declaration, supra note 4, annex II.
110. Id. annex I1(3)(6). The annex also excludes other subjects, but this analysis is
concerned only with foreign relations.
111. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-PLO, 33 I.L.M.
622 [hereinafter Gaza-Jericho Agreement].
112. The area covered by the Declaration includes the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Declaration, supra note 4, art. I. However, the Israeli withdrawal provision only applies to Gaza
Strip and Jericho. Id. art. XIV.
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relations power over the territory contemplated for Palestinian self-rule
will not be included in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement because the trans-
fer is expected in a subsequent agreement.1 13 Both interpretations of
Annex II would be more limited because both approaches would leave
within Palestinian control border disputes with nations other than
Israel, presence of foreign troops other than Israeli, and international
agreements for the use of the territory. The first construction would
leave Israel in control of foreign relations with the territory only with
regard to the withdrawal or deployment of Israeli forces. The second con-
struction would indicate that some further negotiations, or possibly an
agreement, on foreign relations is forthcoming.
Either construction of the Declaration would result in more for-
eign relations power under the control of Palestine. Therefore, Pales-
tine would be closer to establishing the capacity to conduct foreign
relations for the territory under its rule.
However, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement explicitly states that the
foreign relations power is retained by Israel. 114 Therefore, although the
PLO has always maintained foreign relations with other nations, and
although the PLO speaks in the international community for the Pales-
tinian people, it remains undetermined who speaks internationally for
the territory contemplated for Palestinian rule in the Declaration.
For these reasons, Palestine does not meet the requirements of
statehood during the interim period. Although significant steps have
been taken toward establishing an authority exercising governmental
powers, and toward establishing defined boundaries, these steps have
not been significant enough to establish the two requirements. Fur-
ther, the refugee problem prohibits Palestine from defining a perma-
nent population. Lastly, although the PLO has represented the
Palestinian people internationally, the Declaration is not clear as to
whether the PLO may conduct foreign relations for the territory contem-
plated in the Declaration. Thus, while the Declaration does take signifi-
cant strides toward establishing the requirements of statehood for
Palestine, it falls short of accomplishing those requirements during the
interim period.
Part IV provides an analysis of the possibility of a Palestinian state
following the interim period.
113. However, this construction is not likely because the subsequent withdrawal agreement
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IV. STATUS OF PALESTINE AFTER THE INTERIM PERIOD
Part IV analyzes the possibility of Palestinian statehood after the
interim period. Whether a Palestinian state is established after the
interim period will depend largely on the practices of the PLO and
Israel during the interim period. Although the Declaration of Princi-
ples provides a mechanism for resolving the problems that remain for
Palestinian statehood during the interim period, Permanent Status
Negotiations, it remains to be seen whether Israel and the Palestinians
can agree to solve the remaining obstacles to Palestinian statehood
through that mechanism. Part IV concludes by offering some solutions
to help deal with the remaining obstacles to the formation of a Palestin-
ian state.
A. The Requirement of a Defined Territory
Palestine could meet the defined territory requirement after the
interim period because most of the obstacles to Palestine's satisfaction
of this requirement during the interim period involved unresolved ter-
ritorial issues.1 ' Although the Declaration contemplates Palestinian
jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, the Declara-
tion leaves open important issues, namely Jerusalem, Jewish settle-
ments, security arrangements, and borders. 11 6 However, the
Declaration provides a mechanism for deciding these remaining issues:
negotiations between the Government of Israel and representatives of
the Palestinian people. These negotiations are referred to in the Decla-
ration as Permanent Status Negotiations.1 17
Because the Permanent Status Negotiations will cover these
remaining issues, the territory of Palestine will be further defined after
the interim period. The remaining issues need not be resolved in favor
of the Palestinians for Palestine to satisfy the requirement of a defined
territory. There could be a defined territory for Palestine that does not
include Jerusalem or the Jewish settlements. However, resolution of
this issue would help to satisfy the requirement of a defined territory
because it would clarify whether the territory of Palestine includes
these areas.
115. For an explanation of this uncertainty over unresolved territorial issues, see supra part
III.A.
116. Declaration, supra note 4, art. V(3).
117. Id. art. V(2). The Declaration states that Permanent Status Negotiations should begin
as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period. Id.
The Declaration states that negotiations should be between the Government of Israel and
representatives of the Palestinian people. Id.
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The border issue will also be discussed in the Permanent Status
Negotiations."18 Once again, a state of Palestine need not have any
particular borders to satisfy the defined territory requirement. How-
ever, a state of Palestine must set borders to meet the defined territory
requirement.
On a practical level, considerable compromise will be needed to
resolve the remaining territorial issues. Much of the territory contem-
plated in the Interim Agreement to come under Palestinian rule (the
Gaza Strip and West Bank territory) is territory that was lost in the war
of 1967.119 Many Palestinians want the territory lost in the war of
1948 to be included in a state of Palestine.1 20 The dispute over how
much territory to claim could present two problems. First, a problem
may arise in the negotiations if the sides cannot agree on which terri-
tory is Palestinian territory. Second, a problem may arise if the Pales-
tinian negotiators agree to less territory than was lost in 1948. The
Palestinians could lose credibility and support if the negotiators do not
achieve what the majority of Palestinians want.
The territorial problems are enhanced by language in the text of
the Declaration of Principles. The Declaration provides for Palestinian
jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories during the
interim period. However, the Declaration also provides that "the out-
come of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or
preempted by agreements reached for the interim period. ' 121 In other
words, no defined boundaries can be established along these lines until
completion of the Permanent Status Negotiations. Thus, even the
steps taken in the interim period to define Palestinian territory could be
jeopardized by stalled talks in the Permanent Status Negotiations. Of
course, the Declaration's language does not rule out the possibility of
more territory for Palestine than the territory contemplated to come
under Palestinian rule during the interim period (the West Bank and
Gaza Strip). However, even with the possibility of more territory for
Palestine, the Declaration's language significantly hinders attempts to
establish the defined territory requirement of statehood. Thus, only if
the remaining territorial issues are resolved through negotiation will the
defined territory requirement of statehood will be met.
The Jerusalem and Jewish settlement issues are difficult ones for
the negotiators to contend with because of the sensitive nature of Pales-
tinian rule over Jewish people, and because of the religious significance
118. Id. art. V (3).
119. For an explanation of the territory lost in the 1967 war, see QUIGLEY, supra note 15, at
163.
120. For an explanation of the territory lost in the 1948 war, see id. at 57-65.
121. Declaration, supra note 4, art. V(4).
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of Jerusalem for both parties. 122 In 1947 a United Nations General
Assembly Special Committee met to decide the Palestinian issue. Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 181 called for the partition of Palestine into
independent Arab and Jewish states, with a Special International
Regime for the city of Jerusalem.1 23 Jerusalem was to come under
United Nations rule, with the Trusteeship Council responsible for the
city.12
4
The negotiators should look to General Assembly Resolution 181
for guidance when they enter Permanent Status Negotiations.
Although neither side may be willing to give up claims to Jerusalem,
the city could obtain an international/special status, such as a United
Nations trusteeship. If the parties could not agree to international con-
trol of Jerusalem, an arrangement of joint rule should be considered.
On a practical level, international supervision or joint rule may be
no more acceptable to the parties than the present uncertainty over
Jerusalem. Jerusalem is a holy city for both Palestinians and Israelis. 125
Further, there are particular problems regarding the Israelis accepting
international supervision or joint rule. First, Israel has established in
its Basic Law that it considers Jerusalem the capital of the Jewish
state. 126 Therefore, Israel is not likely to relinquish its hold on Jerusa-
lem. Second, it is unlikely that Israel will accept United Nations rule,
or even United Nations participation, in Jerusalem because of the ani-
mosity that has developed between the United Nations and Israel. For
example, the Security Council responded to Israel's Basic Law regard-
ing Jerusalem with Security Council Resolution 478, which states that
it will not recognize the Basic Law. 27 Further, the United Nations has
adopted numerous Resolutions condemning Israeli actions in the Mid-
dle East.128  Thus, it is not likely that Israel will consent to any
arrangement involving the United Nations in Jerusalem.
122. Jerusalem is the first gibla and third holy city of Islam. STEWART SUTHERLAND ET
AL., THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 456 (1988). For the religious significance for Israel, see id. 181,
214.
123. G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., Supp. No. 11 (1947), reprinted in RUTH
LAPIDOTH & MOSHE HIRSCH, THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 33 (1992).
124. Id.
125. See supra note 122.
126. Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 30 July 1980 (Israel), reprinted in LAPIDOTH &
HIRSCH, supra note 123, at 255.
127. S.C. Res. 478, U.N. Doc S/Res/478 (1980), reprinted in LAPIDOTH & HIRSCH, Supra
note 123, at 256 (adopted by 14 votes in favor, none against, with the United States of America
abstaining).
128. The most notable UN condemnation is Security Council Resolution 242. For Security
Council Resolutions concerning Israeli treatment of refugees see Eur. Parl. Ass., supra note 16,
appendix.
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The PLO, however, may be more receptive to United Nations
participation. The 1988 PLO Declaration of Independence included a
provision to put the occupied territories, including Arab Jerusalem,
under United Nations supervision.'29 The provision of the 1988 PLO
Declaration of Independence providing for United Nations supervision
indicates that the PLO would now be willing to submit to United
Nations supervision. However, control of Jerusalem will remain a
problem if Israel retains its traditional view expressed in Israel's Basic
Law. 130
Even if a joint-rule or international arrangement is reached for
Jerusalem, all of the issues regarding this territory would still not be
resolved. For example, the problem of jurisdiction over the people of
Jerusalem remains. It is unlikely that either side will consent to the
other having jurisdiction over its own people. Further, any arrange-
ment regarding Jerusalem is likely to create overlapping jurisdictional
problems. Whether the parties can resolve the issues that prevent the
establishment of the defined territory requirement remains uncertain.
However, attempting international supervision or joint rule for Jerusa-
lem or the Jewish settlements would provide a step toward solving the
remaining problems for establishing the defined territory requirement.
B. The Requirement of a Permanent Population
To be a state, an entity must have a population that is significant
and permanent. 13' The requirement of a permanent population will
likely be met after the interim period. The Declaration of Principles
does not settle the question of whether the refugees from 1948 are
included in the population of Palestine, or only the refugees from 1967
are included; 3 2 however, it does establish a multi-lateral committee to
decide the question. 33 Regardless of what the committee decides, any
definite solution resulting from the committee talks could assist Pales-
tinians in defining the exact population of Palestinian.
To satisfy the permanent population requirement, a particular
population is not necessary. A state of Palestine would merely require
a population that is significant and permanent. 134 Because no particu-
lar population is required, a state of Palestine could satisfy the require-
129. Declaration of Independence by Palestinian National Council, November 18, 1988, 27
I.L.M. 1660 § 2(d).
130. See Basic Law: Jersulam, Capital of Israel, 30 July 1980 (Israel).
131. For the source of this requirement, see supra note 10.
132. For an explanation of the refugee problem, see supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
133. Declaration, supra note 4, art. XII.
134. For a discussion of the source of this requirement, see supra note 10.
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ment with or without the refugees from 1948.135 The result of the
committee talks is therefore immaterial to the satisfaction of the perma-
nent population requirement.
The only situation that would keep Palestine from satisfying the
permanent population requirement is if the committee did not come to
any conclusion on the refugee issue. If the committee could not resolve
the refugee issue, left the issue for further negotiations, or came to a
conclusion so vague that it was impossible to determine which refugees
were included in the state of Palestine, then the permanent population
requirement would not be met.
However, the permanent population requirement probably will be
met after the interim period. Because no particular resolution of the
refugee problem is necessary, any definite resolution reached by the
committee will meet the requirement of a permanent population.
If the committee were to establish a system of immigration to han-
dle the admittance of refugees, it would assist the transition to a situa-
tion where the population of Palestine included any set of refugees.
Such an immigration system need not be designed to allow all the refu-
gees, or only those from 1967, into Palestine. However, some mecha-
nism to help govern refugee "immigration" is necessary. Such a
mechanism for immigration could be used to determine when the refu-
gees should be admitted, and to calculate how many new refugees could
be taken into the territory at one time. An immigration mechanism is
not critical to the Committee's defining which refugees are part of the
Palestinian population, but it could help ease the transition into Pales-
tine for those refugees ultimately included in the State of Palestine. An
immigration mechanism could also help ease the tension between Pal-
estine and Israel if the refugees were slowly re-integrated into the terri-
tory under Palestinian self-rule.
Thus, because the multi-lateral committee is established to decide
the refugee question, a conclusion as to which refugees are included in
the population of Palestine is likely. Because no particular conclusion
on the refugee issue is necessary, the conclusion reached by the com-
mittee will likely satisfy the permanent population requirement of
statehood.
C. The Requirement of an Authority Exercising Governmental
Functions
The major problem for the PLO in establishing a State of Pales-
tine has historically been the requirement of an authority exercising
135. See supra part III.B.
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governmental functions. 136 This requirement could be met after the
interim period if all the measures contemplated in the agreement are
implemented. The Declaration calls for self-rule during the interim
period, including responsibility for education, health, social welfare,
direct taxation, tourism, a police force, and elections.'1 7 However, the
requirement of an authority exercising governmental functions is not
met during the interim period because several areas of governmental
authority are either left open, left to multi-lateral discussion, or left to
Israel.138 Nonetheless, several mechanisms established during the
interim period, including Permanent Status Negotiations and the Pales-
tinian Authorities, could help Palestine meet the requirement of an
authority exercising governmental functions after the interim period.
The first of these mechanisms is Permanent Status Negotia-
tions. 139 Issues related to governmental authority to be discussed dur-
ing the Permanent Status Negotiations include: security arrangements,
borders, and police powers not turned over to the Palestinian police
force.14 If the results of these negotiations give Palestinians control
over security, borders, and the remaining police powers, it could
strengthen the Palestinian authority exercising governmental functions.
The second mechanism that could assist Palestinians meeting the
requirement of an authority exercising governmental functions is the
establishment of Palestinian Authorities in the areas of electricity,
development, the environment, land, and water. 41  Because the Pales-
tinian Authorities will function within the bounds of the Israeli-Pales-
tinian Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, 142 it is
uncertain how much actual authority the Palestinian Authorities will
exercise.1 43 Whether Palestinians will exercise governmental functions
in these territories will be largely determined by the practices of Pales-
tine and Israel during the interim period. However, the Authorities
present Palestinians with the opportunity to assume governmental
authority in the territories of electricity, development, the environment,
land, and water. 144
136. See supra part III.C.
137. Declaration, supra note 4, art. VI(2).
138. See supra part III.C.
139. See Declaration, supra note 4, art. V.
140. See id. art. V(3).
141. Declaration, supra note 4, art. VII(4).
142. The Declaration provides that the Continuing Committee will focus on the areas of
water, electricity, energy, finance, transport, trade, and labor. Id. annex III. These are some of
the same areas to be handled by Palestinian Authorities. See id. art. VII(4) (establishing
Palestinian Authorities).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 89-102.
144. Id. art. VII(4).
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Although there are significant mechanisms for Palestinians to
establish greater authority after the interim period, areas of authority
retained by Israel remain during the interim period. These areas
include the authority to conduct foreign relations for the territory con-
templated to come under Palestinian self-rule, the authority to deal
with external threats, and the authority to re-deploy troops outside
populated territories. 14 s The Declaration does not clearly provide a
mechanism to turn these areas of authority over to the Palestinians. It
is uncertain whether these obstacles to obtaining governmental author-
ity in the interim period will remain obstacles after the interim period.
Further problems for the establishment of an authority exercising
governmental functions involve the PLO. First, the PLO could face an
identity crisis following the interim period. What is the PLO? Is it a
representative of the Palestinian people? Is it a political party? Is it a
government? Concerns about the PLO have already surfaced. In fact,
several PLO officials have refused to join the Palestinian National
Authority. 146
The opposition to the main branch PLO created by the signing of
the Declaration could undermine the power of the PLO.147 The PLO
identity crisis is potentially dangerous because, in the past, Israel has
negotiated with the PLO. It is unclear whether the PLO will turn over
some of its foreign affairs powers to newly elected officials, or whether
much of the "powers" turned over to Palestinian officials will come
under the influence of the PLO. A loss of popular support for the
PLO could create a power vacuum. Considering how resistant the
world community (especially Israel) was historically to the PLO, it is
not likely that the world community (or Israel) will successfully negoti-
ate with representatives of more radical Palestinian factions. In addi-
tion, Israel, or other parties, might be resistant to turning over power
that might end up in the hands of factions more radical than the PLO,
a resistance that could frustrate attempts during Permanent Status
Negotiations to obtain more authority for Palestinians.
145. See Declaration, supra note 4, annex II, arts. VII, XIII.
146. Abdelaziz Barrouhi, Arafat Has Hard Time Forming Self-Rule Government, REurERs,
May 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
147. Of the fifteen organizations under the umbrella of the PLO, twelve oppose the Israeli-
PLO Declaration of Principles. Mark Dennis, Syrian Leader Urged to Control Palestinian
Opposition Groups, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Sept. 17, 1993, at 7. The most influential groups
include: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General
Command. Id. Sources indicate that the opposition groups' main difficulty with the Declaration
is that it does not guarantee a Palestinian state. Id. Members of Hamas, the Islamic Resistance
Movement, also oppose Arafat's efforts at peace. Mamoun Fandy, Consolidating Gains of Israel-
PLO Accord, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 16, 1993, at 19.
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A second problem preventing Palestine from meeting the govern-
mental authority requirement relates to the binding nature of the Dec-
laration.14 The requirement of an authority exercising governmental
functions is essentially what the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles
addresses: self-rule. Because Israel was formerly in control of the terri-
tory that will now come under Palestinian self-rule (the West Bank and
Gaza Strip), any agreement for Palestinian self-rule requires Israel to
turn over powers to the Palestinians. The Declaration requires conces-
sions from both sides and is essentially conditional: Israel must turn
over powers and territory in exchange for promises by the PLO to
denounce terrorism and claim less territory than was originally
demanded.149 However, Israel negotiated with the PLO, and the con-
cessions were made by the PLO. It is uncertain that similar concessions
will result if Israel negotiates with other factions during Permanent Sta-
tus Negotiations.
Permanent Status Negotiations provide an opportunity for Pales-
tine to acquire the necessary authority to establish the requirement of
an authority exercising governmental functions. However, the Decla-
ration does not provide that Permanent Status Negotiations will resolve
all of the remaining issues. The status of the PLO could present
problems that would prevent reaching agreements during Permanent
Status Negotiations. Therefore, while the Declaration provides a
framework for Palestine to achieve the requirement of an authority
exercising governmental functions through Permanent Status Negotia-
tions, it remains uncertain whether the negotiations will ultimately
establish such an authority.
D. The Requirement of the Capacity to Conduct Foreign Relations
The Declaration of Principles does not clearly state whether Pales-
tinians or Israelis have the capacity to conduct foreign relations for the
territory turned over to Palestinians for self-rule."' Who has foreign
affairs powers for the territory after the interim period will therefore be
determined by practice during the interim period. Practice during the
interim period could also establish whether the PLO will continue to
represent the Palestinian people internationally, or whether this power
will be assumed by some other Palestinian representative.
148. For an explanation of the legal classification of the Declaration of Principles, see supra
part II.B.
149. See supra note 66 and accompanying text for an explanation of the conditional nature of
the agreement.
150. For a discussion of the foreign relations capacity for the territory to fall under
Palestinian self-rule see supa part III.D.
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It appears that Palestine is being represented internationally.
PLO and Israeli negotiators continue to meet's' to implement the
terms of the Declaration. Meetings between Israel and the PLO imply
competence on the part of the PLO to continue to represent Palestini-
ans internationally. Second, the Declaration provides for Palestinian
representative involvement in agreements with other Arab nations
regarding refugees and other matters of common concern. 1 s2 This pro-
vision for involvement indicates recognition of the necessity of Pales-
tinian representation in foreign relations.
Recent agreements, however, suggest reluctance on the part of
Israel to grant the PLO, or some other Palestinian representative, for-
eign relations powers.1 3 For example, the Gaza-Jericho agreement
states explicitly that the Palestinian Authority will not have foreign
affairs powers.15 4 Israeli resistance in granting foreign affairs power to
a Palestinian representative could hinder efforts to achieve the require-
ment of the capacity to conduct foreign relations.
Although the requirement of the capacity to conduct foreign rela-
tions has been the least problematic for the PLO, just how this capacity
will be implemented by a state of Palestine is unclear. Whether the
proper group to represent the Palestinians is the PLO, or some other
Palestinian representative, 5 ' is also uncertain.
Elected or appointed Palestinian representatives may be more
legitimate or credible than the PLO in matters of foreign policy. An
elected body that would conduct foreign affairs would also lend credi-
bility to the peace process. However, the PLO appears better able to
negotiate with foreign countries than are other more radical Palestinian
factions.1 S6 Several compromises are available. First, the PLO could
work in conjunction with Palestinian representatives in foreign affairs
until elected representatives could assume foreign relations functions.
Alternatively, appointed or elected officials could represent the Pales-
tinians in foreign affairs with the assistance of the PLO.
The PLO appears to be the best Palestinian representative to
negotiate with the outside world. If the PLO makes too many conces-
151. Deborah Pugh, Cairo Talks Stumble Over Who Controls The Borders, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 31, 1993, at 1 (explaining current stumbling blocks in the ongoing Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations).
152. See Declaration, supra note 4, art. XII (concerning cooperation with Jordan and Egypt).
153. Gaza-Jericho Agreement, supra note 111, art. VI (2) (a).
154. Id.
155. The other alternative bodies to represent Palestinians could include elected Palestinians,
Palestinian negotiators not connected to the PLO, or another organized Palestinian group.
156. The PLO negotiated the Declaration of Principles. Ford, supra note 2.
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sions, it could lose support from the Palestinian people.157 The inter-
national community would then be forced to negotiate with some other
faction representing Palestinians. Perhaps the international community
could work with the PLO in such a manner that would demonstrate
sensitivity to Palestinian concerns."5" The PLO could then garner
more support from Palestinians for its more moderate view. Such sup-
port might alleviate the potential problem of a more radical group
assuming power. The international community should be sensitive to
other Palestinian factions and should support the PLO out of respect
for what they have accomplished: an unprecedented peace agreement
with Israel.
Once the problem of support for Palestine is resolved, and if sup-
port for a more moderate view is available from Palestinians, then both
sides could worry about the "legitimacy" of the PLO. To help with the
legitimacy problem, the PLO could slowly turn over its foreign affairs
power to Palestinian representatives. Transfer could be accomplished
by slowly replacing the PLO personnel at existing PLO missions and
embassies with elected or appointed representatives of the Palestinian
people.
Achieving the objective requirements of statehood will be closer to
being met after the interim period if everything contemplated in the
Declaration of Principles is actually accomplished. Accomplishing
everything the Declaration provides for is, however, very optimistic.
To establish the necessary requirements of statehood will largely
depend on practice during the interim period and the outcome of the
Permanent Status Negotiations.
Further, any Palestinian claim to statehood after the interim
period cannot be established using any of the alternative approaches.
An analysis under the constitutive approach,1" 9 that an entity becomes
a state through recognition by other states, is not changed by the Dec-
laration of Principles. Any changes could affect only the number of
states that recognize Palestine. Under the constitutive approach, the
same problem remains: a government which is recognized before it
meets the requirements of statehood. 161 Therefore, Palestinians should
concentrate on establishing the requirements of statehood according to
the declaratory theory rather than the constitutive approach.
157. See supra note 147 for a discussion of organizations within and without the PLO that
oppose the concessions of the Declaration.
158. See Fandy, supra note 147 (explaining that the Palestinian infrastructure should be
financed by Western dollars).
159. See Alexander, supra note 11, at 859-61, for an analysis of the constitutive approach.
160. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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The other alternative theories for asserting Palestinian statehood,
government-in-exile status,"' or belligerent status, 162 are not furthered
(or perhaps even hurt) by the Declaration of Principles. Belligerent
status (a term more apt for revolutionary forces) is difficult to claim if
Israel and the PLO are negotiating solutions to Palestinian self-rule.
Government-in-exile status is difficult to claim if a Palestinian repre-
sentative government is in existence and is attempting to establish rule
over a defined territory. 16
3
However, Palestine can still claim statehood under the declaratory
approach if practice during and after the interim period establishes the
four objective requirements of that approach. 164
V. THE EFFECTS OF PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD ON UNITED
STATES LAW REGARDING THE PLO
The creation of a state of Palestine will have an effect on several
areas of United States domestic law regarding the PLO. Part V briefly
identifies some of those areas of United States law that could be
affected if a state of Palestine is established. These areas include sover-
eign immunity, standing to sue, and anti-terrorism laws.
A. Sovereign Immunity of Palestine or the PLO
The first area of United States law that could be affected by the
establishment of a Palestinian state is sovereign immunity. The For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act governs situations in which a foreign
state is immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.16 To fall under
this act an entity must meet the requirements of statehood. In the 1991
case Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, the U.S. Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit, held that the PLO did not fall under the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act because it was not a state.166 The court used the
objective Restatement requirements of the declaratory approach to
statehood in making its determination. 167
The objective Restatement requirements are essentially the same
four requirements used in international law to determine whether an
161. See supra text accompanying note 26 for a definition of government-in-exile status.
162. See O'Brien, supra note 27 for a definition of belligerent status.
163. For a discussion of the claim of the PLO to government in exile status, see generally
O'Brien, supra note 26.
164. For the source of the four requirements of statehood, a defined territory, a permanent
population, an authority exercising governmental functions, and the capacity to conduct foreign
relations, see supra note 10.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
166. 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
167. See id. at 47.
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entity is a state.1 68  If a state of Palestine is established under the
Restatement requirements, the status of Palestine under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act would also change. Courts will likely
reevaluate the status of Palestine under the four requirements of state-
hood after the interim period, rather than merely accepting the tradi-
tional view of Palestine. If Palestine meets the objective requirements
after the interim period, it will fall under the terms of the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act as a state because the objective requirements
govern the determination of statehood under the Act.
1 69
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides immunity for
representatives or organs of a foreign state. 70 If Palestine becomes a
state, can the PLO be separated from Palestine and be sued as an
entity? In order to be immune, would it be necessary for the PLO to
act as a representative of Palestine? Is the PLO an organ of the govern-
ment of Palestine similar to the U.S. Department of State? Or is it
similar to an American political party? Like the answers to the ques-
tions presented when determining whether Palestine is a state, the
answer to these questions will be determined largely by practice during
the interim period.17 1 This is especially true regarding the role of the
PLO. The conduct of the PLO during the Interim Period will likely be
that of the representative of Palestine. 172 Thus, the PLO would fall
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as well. 173 However, if
the status of the PLO after the interim period changes to that of a
political party, then the PLO will not fall under the terms of the Act as
a representative or subsidiary of Palestine.
B. The Standing of the PLO or Palestine
The arguments surrounding the standing of an unrecognized gov-
ernment's ability to sue in United States' courts concern similar argu-
ments to those involved in sovereign immunity. An unrecognized
government does not have standing to sue in the courts of the United
168. See supra note 10 and accompanying text for the source of these objective requirements.
169. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1991).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1994).
171. After the interim period there may exist a clearer picture of what role the PLO will play
in the future of Palestine because there will be evidence of that role from practice during the
interim period.
172. See Pugh, supra note 151 (discussing challenges the PLO faces while representing
Palestinian interests).
173. The PLO, as a representative of Palestine, would fall under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act because the Act applies to representatives of a foreign state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603
(1988).
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States. 174 Recognizing a government is not the equivalent of meeting
the requirements of statehood. However, the two are often closely
tied."' s A problem will likely arise if Palestine meets the requirements
of statehood but the United States is slow to recognize its government.
However, the United States is not likely to know whether to recognize
the PLO or some other entity. If the United States is slow to recognize
the government of Palestine, there may be ramifications for the ability
of Palestine, the PLO, or another representative of Palestine, to sue in
U.S. courts.
1 7 6
C. The Anti-Terrorist Act
Further problems for a State of Palestine concern the Anti-Terror-
ism Act of 1987.177 Can U.S. businesses establish ties with the new
territory under Palestinian self-rule now that the PLO has denounced
terrorism?1 7 1 It is important not to restrict U.S. involvement in Pales-
tine because American investment can support the development of Pal-
estinian economic infrastructure. However, the U.S. should realize the
risk to private parties investing in Palestine during the interim period
because investors cannot be sure they will be dealing with the same
parties after the interim period.
VI. CONCLUSION
The traditional view of Palestine is that it does not meet the
requirements of statehood. 179 The Israeli-PLO Declaration of Princi-
ples presents an opportunity to reevaluate this traditional view.
Although significant obstacles to the creation of a Palestinian state
remain during the interim period, there are mechanisms in place that
could establish a Palestinian state following the interim period. The
success of these mechanisms depends on practice during the interim
period. However, the Declaration of Principles presents significant
174. See Edwin L. Fountain, Note, Out from the Precarious Orbit of Politics: Reconsidering
Recognition and the Standing of Foreign Governments to Sue in U.S. Courts, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 473,
482-84 (1989) (standing contingent upon government recognition). See also Alexander, supra note
11, at 882.
175. See supra note 13 (explaining the relationship between the four requirements of the
declaratory approach to recognition and the effect of recognition on statehood).
176. See REsTATEmENT OF FoRIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 205 (explaining that an
unrecognized government is ordinarily denied access to courts of the United States).
177. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5203 (1988).
178. At the time of the Declaration at least 15 different measures (statutes and executive
measures) existed that criminalized PLO activities and associations in the United States. Jane
Friedman, In Reversal, PLO May Get Diplomatic Outpost in U.S., CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Sept. 29, 1993, at 7. Legislation has been introduced subsequent to the Declaration to repeal some
of the restrictions. Id.
179. See Prince, supra note 5, for a discussion of the traditional view of Palestine.
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steps toward establishing a Palestinian state. If the outcome of the Per-
manent Status Negotiations leaves Palestinians with more governmen-
tal powers, and if negotiations produce definite results on issues
regarding population and territory, a state of Palestine could be
established.
